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The „New" Quantitative History: Social Science
or Old Wine in New Bottles?
Much has been written and said in recent years of the emergence of a variety of
„new" histories1. To the casual observer the diversity of the new histories may
seem bewildering and even convey the impression of pretensious craving for the
appearance, but not the substance, of innovation. And, indeed, the new histories
have provoked substantial controversy and criticism on exactly those grounds. Yet
even the most cursory examination of the recent literature suggests numerous depar-
tures from the preoccupations of traditional historiography. New themes are explor¬
ed, new methods employed, new sources exploited and neglected social mstitutions
examined in new ways. Some of the elitist bias that has long been a dominant cha¬
racteristic of historical research and writing has dissipated as historians have attemp¬
ted to use new sources to examine the conditions and behavior of the ordinary
people of the past. Above aU, perhaps, a growing number, but stül a minority, of
historians have made increased use of quantitative methods and tools. If there is a
common denominator that cuts across the varieties of the new histories, it is quan¬
tification, and it is possible to speak with accuracy of the recent emergence of a
quantitative form of historical inquiry.
These new scholarly interests and endeavors have been marked by their fair share
of false Starts and mistaken directions. A cadre of curmudgeonly critics among hi¬
storians, and even including a few practitioners of the other social sciences, have de-
cleared all such efforts barrren, not history, and fated only to do violence of the li¬
terary values and the humane traditions of conventional historiography.lt is certain¬
ly true that claims for the new histories have sometimes been unduly exalted and
that the new approaches to the study of the past have not yet produced the revolu¬
tionary new knowledge that their more optimistic and aggressive proponents some¬
times promised. Yet it is also true that these new efforts have aheady enriched
historical studies.
The purpose here, however, is not to detaü or celebrate the characteristics,
accomplishments and faüures of each of the new histories. To do so would require a
treatise of tiresome length. In any event, numerous „State of the art" essays con-
This paper draws upon two essays written in collaboration with Professor Allan G. Bogue
and William H. Flanigan and pubUshed in American Behavioral Scientist, 21 (November/Decem-
ber 1977). While the present paper profits greatly from their erudition and insights, neither of
them is responsible for errors of fact, judgment or interpretation which it may inciude.
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cerned in one way or the other with these new approaches to historical inquiry have
appeared in recent years2. These essays, and the numerous works which they re¬
ference, amply demonstrate both the diversity and the vitality of the new histories.
Hie goals of the present essay are different and more modest. It is concerned with
quantitative approaches to historical inquiry primarily as practiced by historians in
the United States and, in the first instance, with progress toward the emergence of a
social scientific history — or, more properly, with progress toward a form of histori¬
cal inquiry devoted to the development of scientific knowledge of human behavior.
A second concern is with obstacles that lie in the way of a form of historical in¬
quiry so conceived and motivated.
The „New" Quantitative History
Tables, graphs, charts and even elaborate Statistical formulations have become
common elements in the research reports of historians. Quantification has become an
accepted, although by no means universally welcomed, element ofthe historical disci-
püne. The use of quantitative methods and materials by historians has opened the way
for forward Steps in the advancement of historical knowledge; major contributions to
historical knowledge that rest in critical ways on the application of quantitative
tools and materials can be cited; and the use of those tools and materials has resul¬
ted in a literature that often appears quite unlike the product of more conventional
historical research.
In view of these obvious manifestations of change within the historical discipline
it may seem remarkable that, from many perspectives, the most striking develop¬
ments in historical inquiry have come not from professional historians but from
scholars outside the disciphne. And here, perhaps to betray a parochial bias, recent
comparative studies of pohtical and societal change — whether termed moderni¬
zation, development or described under some other rubric — that sweep broadly
across both modern history and the contemporary era might be particularly singled
out . The ultimate value of the theoretical and conceptual formulations that have
emerged from such studies is surely questionable, but it is certainly the case that
they east the politics and society of the past in new perspective, point new direct¬
ions for historical research, and call into doubt long-accepted explanations of his-
See, for example, Bogue, AUan G. (ed.), Emerging Theoretical Models in Social and Political
History, in: American Behavioral Scientist, 16 (May/June 1973); Bogue, Allan G., and Clubb,
Jerome (eds.), History and the Social Sciences: Progress and Prospects, in: American Behavioral
Scientist, 21 (November/December 1977); and Lorwin, Val R., and Price, Jacob M. (eds.),
The Dimensions of the Past: Materials, Problems and Opportunities for Quantitative Work in
History, New Haven 1972. See also Swierenga, Robert P., Computers and American History:
The Impact of the ,New* Generation, in: The Journal of American History, 60 (March 1974);
and The New PoUtical History: Progress and Prospects, in: Computers and the Humanities,
11 (September/October 1977).
This is not to overlook the pioneering work of such historians as Cyril E. Black.
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torical events. They attempt as well to present an integrated view of politics and
society that is often — perhaps usuaUy — missing from the work of historians.
The historical studies conducted by social scientists are remarkable enough in
then* own right. Two considerations seem more remarkable. One is the fact that
social scientists have not placed greater reliance upon the work of historians but
have tended instead to develop then* own form of historical inquiry. A second and,
for present purposes, more important consideration is the reactions of historians to
these studies, at least in the United States,and including many quantitative histo¬
rians. For many historians, both „new" and otherwise, the scope of such largescale
comparative studies seems monumental, even grandiose. Critical relations seem to
be merely assumed rather than demonstrated; conceptual and theoretical formula¬
tions seem excessively abstract and mechanistic and not easüy operationalized in
terms of historical data. Above aU, perhaps, such studies seem to play too fast and
loose with chronology and to lack the rieh sense of time, place and specific context
to which historians are aecustomed. Seemingly disparate phenomena are classified,
lumped together and compared apparently with little regard for temporal order or
historical context. These considerations suggest differences in orientation between
historians, on the one hand, and social scientists who use the past as a source of evi¬
dence, on the other. They suggest, as weU, that history, even quantitative history,
has moved only a little way in the direction of social science.
The basis of these differences and their significance can be partiaUy elueidated
by brief consideration of the genesis of quantitative approaches to historical inquiry.
It is frequently suggested that quantitative history is characterized by a marked affi¬
nity with the related social sciences and that, indeed, these new approaches grew
out of the social sciences. In fact, affinity with the social sciences is clear and expli¬
cit in terms of the use of quantitative techniques and source materials. An affinity
is also present, but substantiaUy less explicit and less clear, where conceptual and
theoretical formulations are concerned. But the new quantitative history can also
and perhaps more accurately be seen as a product of basic canons of traditional
historical method. To a considerable degree, the new use of quantitative techniques
and source materials grew out of the traditional historiographical requirement that
aU source materials and aU relevant methods be used to gain the most detaüed,
complete, and objective view possible of past events, personages and situations. Put
differently, the use of new techniques and source materials has meant no necessary
deviation from the goal of traditional historiography — to describe and reconstruet
the past „as it actually happened". Neither does that use involve necessarily a depar-
ture from the methodological assumptions of traditional historiography, nor does it
necessarily look directly toward development of scientific knowledge of human
affairs.
These considerations may help to explain some of the characteristics of early
applications of quantitative techniques and materials by historians. In general,
quantitative historians did not escape the tendency to focus research upon limited
historical episodes and problems. That tendency in turn also worked, of course, to
promote an excessively compartmentalized and static view of human affairs. If any-
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thing, moreover, the higher costs of research using quantitative data and methods,
as compared with more conventional approaches, led initiaüy to concern for even
more narrow and more Umited research topics and to heavier emphasis upon case
studies. Thus the findings produced by much of the early work were of limited or,
at best, unknown generaüty. This is not to issue a blanket indictment of the case
study approach. It is to say, however, that the early view — that multiplication of
case studies in the absence of comparable methods and data and without theory
would lead to general findings — was faUacious.
A more serious legacy of traditional historiography was in the areas of concept
and theory. As David Potter observed in 1963:
Orthodox or formal historical method was shaped at a time when men believed that a body
of data would reveal its own meaning and would interpret itself, if only it were valid or authen-
tic and were arranged in time sequence. The central problem of method, therefore, was to vali-
date the data rather than to interpret them. Hence the problem of historical Interpretation was
neglected; indeed its very existence as a problem was denied at the theoretical level, and the
principal questions which the problem of interpretation ought to have posed were left to non-
historians. Thus the problem of causation has been left to the phÜosophers; the problem of
human motivation has been left to psychologists; the problem of social Organization has been
left to the sociologists .
Thus vahd understanding of historical events, processes and persons could be gained
simply by Consulting aU relevant sources — or, through „emersion in the sources" as
it is stül often put. Causal relations were seen as self-evident or asserted on the ba¬
sis of intuition; human attitudes and motivation were also seen as self-evident or
identifiable essentiaüy through processes of empathy. Interpretation, systematic
theory and generahzation were unnecessary. To a considerable degree the early
quantitative historians retained these views and assumptions, and it is by no means
the case that they have yet entirely disappeared.
The impact of these assumptions was readüy observable in much of the early
work of quantitative historians. Energy was invested in acquiring conversance with
the tools of quantification. Emphasis was placed, however, on techniques of data
analysis, and for many data analysis was apparently simply an alternative means to
„emersion in the sources". But despite investment of energy, famüiarity with tech¬
niques of data analysis was usuaUy gained through self-training and in essentiaüy
„cookbook" fashion. Outside the field of economic history, neither training oppor¬
tunities, the curriculum in history, nor the structure of professional rewards were
such as to encourage acquisition of meaningful formal training in mathematics and
related areas. The consequence was that the properties of Statistical procedures
were often not fuUy understood with the further result that aU too frequently
applications of those procedures were naive and erroneous.
Too httle attention was directed to problems of conceptuahzation, measurement
Potter, David M., Explicit Data and Implicit Assumptions in Historical Study, in: Gott¬
schalk, Louis (ed.), Generalizations in the Writing of History: A Report of the Committee on
Historical Analysis ofthe Social Science Research Council, Chicago 1963.
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and inference. It was not fuUy recognized that selection of appropriate Statistical
modeis requires conceptuaUzation of the historical processes and phenomena of
concern. In the absence of that conceptualization, inappropriate Statistical modeis
were frequently apphed. Much of the early work of quantitative historians involved
a marked tendency to, in effect, „reify" empirical data and to treat empirical data
as effectively synonymous with underlying concepts. The measurement gap — the
gap between data and concept
— was overlooked. Thus voting records were some¬
times treated as direct measures of mass partisan attitudes or populär policy prefer¬
ences, occupational or educational characteristics were taken as straightforward in-
dications of social status or position, and change in such characteristics was taken as
a direct measure of social mobüity. The need for conceptuaUzation — for auxüiary
theory — to link data to concept was not recognized. Causal inferences were often
drawn, asserted and refuted, but without adequate empirical Warrant or test and
without theoretical justification5.
The early forays into quantification, in short, did not free historians from the
assumption of nineteenth Century „scientific" historiography that data are some¬
how self-interpreting. Like their more conventional coUeagues, quantitative histo¬
rians tended to be essentiaüy atheoretical, although important exceptions could be
cited. It was not, of course, that theoretical formulations and generalizations were
absent from their work. In fact, the actual structure of explanation in numerous
quantitative historical works was provided, not by historical sources, but by genera¬
lizations and theories — by „covering laws" — drawn from common sense, personal
phüosophy, ideology, or an obsolete social science. Indeed, without these genera¬
lizations and theoretical formulations, meaningful and explanations of historical
events could not have been constructed6. These formulations, however, were
usuaUy implicit and untested and were seldom subjected to self-conscious and criti¬
cal examination.
The new economic, or „cliometric", history — theoretically and mathematically
the most elegant and advanced of the new histories — was a partial exception. In
this area neo-classical economic theory was explicitly and rigorously employed as a
basis for estimation and measurement, to interpret and „make sense" of historical
data, and to resolve long-contested questions in economic history. On the other
hand, neoclassical theory was primarily used to explain the phenomena of the past;
substantiaUy less attention was directed to using the data of the past to extend, test
and refine economic theory7.
For a discussion of one illustration of these problems see Clubb, Jerome M., and Allen,
Howard W., CoUective Biography and the Progressive Movement: The ,Status Revolution' Re-
visited, in: Social Science History, 1 (Summer 1977).
The point of view expressed here draws upon Hempel, C. G., The Function of General Laws
in History, in: Gardiner, Patrick (ed.), Theories of History, Glencoe/Ill. 1959; Murphey, Murray
G., Our Knowledge of the Historical Past, Indianapolis/Ind. 1973; and Potter, Explicit Data and
Implicit Assumptions.
See North, Douglass C, The New Economic History after Twenty Years, in: American Be¬
havioral Scientist, 21 (November/December 1977).
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Substantial progress has been made in many of these respects. Greater attention
is now given to matters of representation. The case study approach is less common¬
ly employed, and historians less frequently claim generality for findings based upon
case studies. Proficiency in the use of analytical techniques has grown, and an in¬
creasing number of historians have benefitted from formal training in the tools and
methods of quantitative inquiry. In the use of these tools historians have become
more sophisticated and subtle, and at least passing concern is directed to problems
of measurement. Thus it is possible to speak of the emergence of a new history. His¬
torians now attempt to gain a more complete view of the past; they are more
comprehensive in their use of source material; and they are no longer satisfied with
a history that merely recounts the doings of the few of power and position of the
past. Rather historians have devoted greater attention to the ordinary men and wo¬
men of the past, to basic but neglected social institutions, and to events and con¬
ditions at the „grass roots".
But if we speak of central tendencies, this is a history that remains primarily de¬
dicated to traditional historiographical goals. WhÜe historians have become more
attuned to the related social sciences, their use of generalization and theory is stül
largely implicit and uncritical, and the role of theory and generalization in historical
explanation is as yet only partiaUy recognized. The quantitative work of historians
is primarily concerned with specific episodes and events which are selected for ex¬
amination on the basis of their intrinsic historical interest. In the main, the goal of
quantitative historians is to reconstruct and describe the past „as it actuaUy happe¬
ned", and reconstruction and description of past events is taken as an end in itself.
On the other hand, substantiaUy less in the way of systematic and self-conscious
effort is directed to using the evidence of the past to develop generalizations and to
refine and construct theoretical formulations. Whether pursued in quantitative or
other ways, these goals and efforts faü short of social science and do not promise to
fuüy realize the potentiality of historical inquiry as a means to contribute to scien¬
tific knowledge of human affairs.
It may weU be that recognition of the value of quantitative methods and ma¬
terials as tools of historical inquiry will lead to reorientation of the historical disci¬
pline in social scientific directions. Quantification is not, however, the only attri-
bute of science. As yet, the use of quantitative methods and materials has led few
historians, to use Charles Tüly's words, „quite outside history, in[to] that timeless
realm in which situations, persons, or events plucked from the past or the present
serve as tests of general Statements about social life." A new quantitative history
has emerged, but that history carries us only a little way toward contribution to the
development of scientific knowledge of human affairs.
This is not to say, of course, that aü historians will, or should, pursue social
scientific goals. The effort to develop valid and reliable descriptions and explana-
8
TiUy, Charles, Quantification in History, As seen from France, in: Lorwin, The Dimensions
of the Past, p. 108.
18
tions of historical events is obviously a laudable intellectual enterprise in its own
right. Indeed, valid and reliable reconstruction of past events and situations would
be a vital component of social scientific historical inquiry. It is to say, however,
that historical inquiry dedicated to scientific ends would require a further and more
radical transformation than quantitative, or other, historians have yet accomplished
It is also to say that because of the central and necessary role of generalization and
theory in historical explanation, elements of that transformation are required if
more valid and reliable reconstruction of past events is to be achieved.
Problems of Historical Data
Aspects of the required transformation, and broad characteristics of the form of
historical studies that would be its consequence, can be readüy recognized if the
goals and limitations of the contemporary social sciences are considered. A central
goal of the social sciences is to identify regularities in human affairs and to develop
empirically refutable theoretical formulations which link together and explain those
regularities. In the pursuit of this goal, however, the social sciences are constrained
by sharply limited capacity to experiment where human beings are concerned. To
compensate for these limitations, social scientists have recognized the necessity of
examining and comparing social phenomena in a variety of situational contexts, and
attention is devoted to comparative studies across nations, cultures, regions and
subnational groups. The past affords an opportunity to extend these efforts and to
examine a wider variety of human behavior in a wider variety of contexts.
Viewed in these terms, the past can be used to formulate hypotheses and to test
those based upon investigation of contemporary phenomena, to examine develop¬
mental processes, to systematicaUy trace trends and change over time, and to identi¬
fy the determinants of societal change. The task of a genuinely social scientific
historian would be to use the past to construct empirical social theory rather than
to merely use social theory to describe and explain specific events of the past. To
do so effectively, however, would require that historians give greater attention to
the epistomological bases and limitations of then* work. Greater and more serious
attention to matters of method would also be required and not merely to matters
of technique but to broader issues of measurement, design, conceptualization and
inference as well. In their teaching and research historians would devote less atten¬
tion to the specific facts and episodes of history and more to Interpretation and
theory. Substantial attention might also be directed to Classification of historical
and contemporary events, processes, institutions and populations in terms of pro-
perties relevant to particular theoretical formulations. By the same token, specific
events and phenomena would be investigated not for their intrinsic historical interest
but in terms of their relevance to theoretical concerns.
But even if reorientations of this sort are both possible and desirable, critical
problems are encountered. To a considerable degree these problems relate to the
characteristics and limitations of historical source materials, and, it is worth nothing,
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these problems are equaüy severe where achievement of the goals of traditional
historiography are concerned. Indeed, in view of the gravity of these problems it is
legitimate to ask whether historical inquiry can ever be any more than a tincture of
empirical evidence combined with bits of useful theory and mixed with large ele¬
ments of impression, surmise and empathetic understanding.
The source materials upon which historians must rely are virtuaUy by definition
„process produced." It is true that historians occasionaüy have at their disposal data
that were coUected by social scientists to serve the purpose of social scientific re¬
search. As the specious present slides imperceptably into the historical past, we can
imagine that historians will turn to the rieh sample survey data now being religious-
ly coUected and maintained by social science data archives. But we can also imagine
that historians in the future wül regard these data as no less process produced —
produced in this case by the process of social research as archaicaUy practiced in the
mid-twentieth Century — and will bemoan the fact that the wrong data were collect¬
ed, the wrong questions asked, and that underlying assumptions and methods were
not better documented.
The central difficulty where process-produced data are concerned is, of course,
that the data were not coUected, compüed and preserved with the needs of re¬
searchers in mind. Rather they are simply the byproduets of ongoing social, govern¬
mental and economic processes. Historical process-produced data involve additional
complexities for these are data that have been filtered and winnowed by the pro¬
cesses of time. Historical research, in other words, is limited not only to data — and
information about data — that was once collected but also to data and information
that have survived. Historical data, in other words, are the residual process-produced
data that have survived the ravages of time.
In their work historians sometimes confront an embarrassment of riches but
most frequently their research must be conducted below the data poverty line. For
a few problems, relevant data are voluminous indeed, and their effective use would
involve a truly monumental data coUection and processing effort. For most
problems, however, data are at best incomplete, and for vast areas of historical
concern data are virtuaUy nonexistent. Aside from a few treasure troves, for example,
data that bear on mass attitudes in the past do not exist, and Statements in this area
must be based on often dubious inferences from behavioral data.
Historians, of course, give great thought and attention to their sources. Indeed,
source criticism is a central element of traditional historical methods. But conven¬
tional source criticism carries us only a little way. External source criticism is con¬
cerned with assessment of the authenticity of sources; internal criticism involves
examination of texts to identify error, misrepresentation and inconsistency. A
systematic historical inquiry that attempts to conform to scientific canons of verifi-
cation and explanation requires that much more be known of the nature and pro-
perties of sources and data.
Murray Murphey is one of the few historians who has devoted systematic attent¬
ion to the characteristics of historical data and to the methods available for their
use. He Singles out five methodological problems that result from the characteristics
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of historical data9. Whüe these problems could be summarized in various ways,
Murphey's discussion is both succinct and useful. The first of these is the problem
of quantity which was just alluded to. The second is the problem of aggregation.
Historical data are frequently available at a level of aggregation that is inappropriate
to research concerns. In the most usual case, data are avaüable in the form of
summary measures or indices or as aggregated values for population groups and geo¬
graphical units. It is not, of course, that summary measures and aggregated data are
useless for many of the purposes of research. In fact, such data are frequently use¬
ful indeed. It is only that a variety of research problems require disaggregated data.
A third problem is that of samphng. Most — in a sense aü — historical data are in¬
complete and can be seen as samples from total universes. In most cases, however,
neither the properties of the universe nor of the sample are known. Murphey de¬
scribes a fourth problem as that of „informant bias" which, put simply, is the
problem of the reliabüity and, unlike contemporary social scientists, the historian
has no opportunity to query and cross examine informants to determine reliabüity.
The final problem indentified by Murphy is that of measurement which is part
and parcel of the general problem of measurement confronted by all social
scientists. In the historian's case, however, the problem is enormously comphcated
by the fragmentary nature of historical data and by the absence of data that bear
upon the perceptions, the attitudes, and the cognitive Systems of historical indivi¬
duals. To these problems a sixth, that of specification, can be added, although it is
reaUy subsumed under other categories. The simple fact is that historians frequently
cannot adequately specify modeis of historical processes or effectively test for
spurious relations because appropriate data were either never collected or were not
preserved. As a consequence, capacity to convincingly refute or support otherwise
meaningful hypotheses is often sharply limited.
Again, these problems could be stated in a variety of ways, and the preceding
summary may do some violence to Murphey's formulations. Even so it may serve to
point the issues. We can note that Murphey's formulations seem to reflect an undue
preoccupation with research that focuses upon mdividuals. Research at a more ma-
croscopic level may not confront these same problems, or, at least, not with the
same severity. And, as Murphey points out, some of these problems may be amen¬
able to at least partial Solution. Even at best, however, the critique is chastening.
Clearly, a systematic history that pays due regard to problems of data, verification
and inference cannot provide as rieh or as fuUsome a view of the past as is often
pretended to through intuitive, empathetic and impressionistic approaches. It is
clear as weU that capacity to use the past as a source of evidence to test and con¬
struct social theory is similarly hmited. Perhaps the first lesson to be learned is one
of limitations.
This is not to suggest, however, that the limitations and fragmentary nature of
historical data preclude, as has sometimes been argued, application of advanced and
complex quantitative techniques. Indeed, quite the reverse is the case. The very in-
Murphey, Our Knowledge of the Historical Past, especiaUy Chapter 6.
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adequacies of historical data require more complex analytical techniques and more
subtle and sophisticated applications than are required for more perfect and less ob-
streperous data. If anything, moreover, greater methodological expertise is probably
required for fuüy effective research use of historical data than is required for much
of the more perfect contemporary data employed by social scientists.
Certainly the limitations of historical data dictate research in new areas. Metho¬
dological research of the sort that Murphey suggests is obviously required. Areas in
which methodological innovation is clearly needed are also obvious. They inciude
techniques for sampling from incomplete records, for estimating missing data, and,
most obviously, for estimating individual level relations from aggregated data. And
here the picture is even more chastening. While the technical expertise of historians
has steadüy risen in recent years, it is stül, at least in the United States, low indeed
compared with that of the related social sciences. Few historians are equipped to
carry out methodological research or to solve methodological problems, and un¬
fortunately, given the nature of training programs in the universities of the United
States, opportunities and inducements to acquire necessary expertise are stül by no
means abundant. Thus, there is need for the development of alternative sources of
training including that of a „retooling" nature.
And more can be done to improve capacity to employ historical data and to faci¬
litate better realization of the potentialities of the evidence of the past for the pur¬
suit of social scientific goals. Accomplishment of these tasks would require that
historians place greater value on prosaic but demanding activities that are now
neither particularly well-regarded nor weU-recognized in the distribution of pro¬
fessional rewards. Substantial efforts might usefuüy be directed to the development
of systematic measures and indicators of social phenomena extending across long
historical periods. These tasks would involve more than data collection; rather they
would require systematic evaluation of data sources and collection and combination
of data to create estimates to measure and reflect Substantive and theoretical con¬
cepts. Examples of work of this sort inciude the historical economic indexes and
estimates developed by the National Bureau of Economic Research, the efforts of
Walter Dean Burnham, and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research to create reliable estimates of mass electoral participation and behavior
for the United States during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as well as the
systematic information on the characteristics of the international State system
during the same period developed by J. David Singer and his associates.
Indeed, a new form of historiography is needed, as Charles Tilly suggests in
another context, one that is concerned with the nature and properties of historical
sources . Much more can be learned of the structure of social bookkeeping
Systems of the past. If more was known of the functions of historical administrative
Systems, for example, improved capacity to estimate the kinds of biases and error
Tüiy, Quantification in History, pp. 110 passim. See also NarroU, RaouU, Data Quality Con¬
trol, New York 1970.
22
that are hkely to characterize the data which they gathered would be gained. Most
historians have encountered shifts in time series which might signify change in pro¬
duction levels, in the incidence of violence, or in rates of voter participation but
which might also reflect no more than change in recording procedures or in defi¬
nitions or classifcation Systems. Better knowledge of the Operation of social book¬
keeping Systems might provide clues for the Interpretation of such changes. And
much the same can be said of information preservation. If more was known of the
functions that information preservation was intended to serve in past situations,
then historians might be better equipped to estimate the representative quality and
the limitations of surviving records.
Inquiry of this sort would not be limited to the formal Operations and functions
of historical social bookkeeping Systems. More could be learned of the Operation of
historical taxation Systems and of the means by which the tax collector could be
cheated. In this way, the error and bias characteristic of production and wealth
statistics might be better diagnosed. We know that in the past, as in the present, it was
sometimes to the interest of poüce and law enforcement agencies to maximize the
reported incidence of crime and violence, and at other times minimization of that
incidence was to their interest. Consideration of the nature of specific historical
situations might allow better assessment of the direction, if not the magnitude, of
the bias likely to be characteristic of statistics of crime and violence.
Much more could be done in the way of source, or data, criticism. As an
example, two historians using what amounts to an extension of methods of internal
criticism have convincingly demonstrated the presence of substantial „biased under-
enumeration" in the data provided by the nineteenth Century censuses of the Uni¬
ted States1 . Their work caUs into question findings reported in a number of studies
based on that source and is depressing in that respect. On the other hand, their
work, and that of others, also provides grounds for optimism. At a minimum such
efforts look toward identification of the categories of research that the censuses
wül and will not support. Thus these efforts look toward identification of limits.
Obviously, if more can be learned of both the direction and magnitude of bias then
pitfalls confronted in the use of the source will be reduced or eliminated. And
clearly, such efforts can be extended to other categories of source materials.
More effective use of the evidence of the past would require, in other words,
larger and more systematic investment of energy and talent in activities that are
now often seen — quite wrongly — as preliminary and essentiaüy ancülary to the
actual research process. The requirement is not surprising for it has already been en¬
countered in the other social sciences. Sample survey research is a case in point.
What might be termed the technology of survey research has become an area of
specialization, and a variety of subspecializations in aspects of that technology have
appeared which ränge from sample and instrument design through interviewing
Sharpless, John B., and Shortridge, Ray M., Biased Underenumeration in Census
Manuscripts: Methodological Imphcations, in: Journal of Urban History, 1 (August 1975).
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techniques to data preparation, management and archiving. If the use of historical
evidence in the pursuit of social scientific goals was taken seriously, appearance of
analogous specializations and areas of specialized knowledge and activity related to
historical source material might be anticipated, encouraged and rewarded.
But these can be only partial remedies for the shortcomings of historical sources.
Historical data that were never coUected cannot be created; data that was once
coUected but destroyed cannot be recreated. Even at best, the data of the past wül
remain incomplete and error ridden and critical variables willbe lacking. The capa¬
city of social scientists to use the data of the historical past to develop scientific
knowledge of human behavior will remain similarly limited. It may be worth re-
membering, however, that astronomers also study phenomena that are distant in
both time and space. The data of astronomy are in some ways similar to those of
history. The astronomer's data is also a residue — the residual radiation from
spaciaUy and temporaUy distant stellar bodies that has penetrated to earth after
countless fütering mechanisms have taken their toll. Astronomers have the advan¬
tage of the laws of physics which allow diagnosis of the effects of those filters and
which facüitate development of compensatory information. A system of social
knowledge that equals physic in rigor and precision probably cannot be expected.
Even so, an improved social science would increase the utility of historical evidence
for the pursuit of scientific knowledge of human affairs, and the study of the past
can contribute to that improvement.
The use of quantitative methods and materials by historians has already contri¬
buted to a more comprehensive and enriched view of the past. But if historians are
to join in the quest for scientific knowledge of human affairs, the agenda of change
remains long and crowded, and it leads „quite outside history". Historians may not
choose to abandon the goals of nineteenth Century historiography, but even the
effort to create a more valid and reliable view of the past requires further and more
radical transformation of then* craft than has yet occured.
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